Chapter 3Book Three - The Harmony of Virtue

Book Three Keshav Ganesh — Broome Wilson — Treneth Treneth — But we must not forget our purpose in being here. Keshav — Well, Broome, what do you say to our resuming our cruise for the discovery of virtue? I avow the speculation weighs on me, and I am impatient to see the last of it. Wilson — I have not to learn that you are the most indolent of men. No sooner are you in a novel current of thought than you tire and swim back to the shore. I am indignant with Nature for wasting on you a genius you so little appreciate. Treneth — Ah but you are really quite wrong, Wilson. Ge- nius is a capacity for being indolent. Wilson — Enter Prince Paradox! But seriously, Keshav, I think the argument will live beyond this afternoon and I give warning that I shall drag you all over the field of ethics before we have done with it. Keshav — It will be the corpse of my intellect you will mal- treat. But in extremity I rely upon Treneth to slay my Argus with the bright edge of a paradox. Wilson — We were at the third rung of the ladder, were we not? Keshav — Yes, thou slave-driving Ishmaelite. I declare it is impious on a day like this to bury ourselves in the gloomy vaults of speculation. But as you will. To remember how far we have climbed, is the best incentive to climb farther, and will give Treneth an idea of the situation. We happened to be weighing the ordinary principles of morality and finding them all wanting cast about for a new principle and discovered that beauty was the sole morality of the universe, and it had colour, form and perfume as elements, harmony as its general effect and proportion, which we described as regular

The Harmony of Virtue variety or method in madness, as the ulterior cause of the har- mony, and we ventured to imagine that as all the other elements of the universe were harmonious notes in a perfect sonata, but the human element had wilfully chosen to jar upon and ruin the exquisite music, the right principle of virtue was wilfully to choose to mend the harmony we had ruined. With these projections from the rock of speculation to help us we climbed up the three steep and difficult rungs I am going to describe to you. We argued that the only way to remedy a note that rebels against the spirit of the composition is to reduce it into harmony with that spirit, and so arrived at the conclusion that the principle of morality is to apply to human life the principles that govern the rest of the Cosmos. There you have the first rung of our ladder. We recommenced from this basis and by remembrance of the nature of proportion or regular variety which is the cause of harmony and throughout every natural type of beauty appears in the common principle which determines their line of variance from each other, we thought that in the elements of the Cosmos there must be such a common principle and found it to be the evolution by each element of its own peculiar virtue as distinct from the peculiar virtues of every other element, and so reached our second conclusion, that just as astral virtue lies in the evo- lution by the star of the inborn qualities and powers native to its astral character, just so human virtue lies in the evolution by the human being of the inborn qualities and powers native to his humanity. This is the second rung of our ladder. With this second secure basis behind us, we went on to discover that within generic types such as the star, the flower, the human being, there were individual types governed by the similar but different principle of evolving the individual as dis- tinct from the generic virtues, or, when applied to the human being, of evolving the inborn qualities and powers native to his personality. This is the third rung of our ladder. Have I been correct in my statement, Broome? Wilson — Perfectly correct. Treneth — My only quarrel with your conclusions is that

The Harmony of Virtue you have wasted a couple of evenings in arriving at them. Why, except the first they are mere axioms. Keshav — Yes, to the seeing eye they are axioms, but to the unseeing eye they are paradoxes. The truths that are old and stale to the philosopher, are to the multitude new and startling and dangerous. But now that we have all mounted to the same rung, let us pursue the ascent. And I suppose our immediate step will be to find whether the mere evolution of the inborn qualities and powers is or is not the sole requisite for virtue. Wilson — Before we go to that, Keshav, you will have to meet a difficulty which you show every sign of evading. Keshav — Whatever difficulty there is, I am ready to solve, but I cannot guess to what you refer. Wilson — I suppose you will admit that a definition, to be adequate, must have nothing vague or indefinite about it? Keshav — If there is anything vague, it must be elucidated or our statement falls to the ground. Treneth — I dissent: a definite definition is a contradiction in terms. I am for definite indefinitions. Keshav — I am not in extremities yet, Prince Paradox. Wilson — Well now, is not your phrasing “the inborn qual- ities and powers native to our humanity” very vague and indef- inite? Keshav — Indefinite, I admit, and I cannot think that an objection but I plead not guilty to the charge of vagueness. Wilson — You think with Treneth that a definition should not be definite? Keshav — If by being definite is implied reduction to its primal elements you will agree with me that a definition need not be definite: or do you want me to enumerate the qualities native to our humanity such as physical vigour, and the faculty of in- ference and sexual passion and I do not know how many more? Wilson — You shall not escape me so easily, Keshav. You are merely spinning dialectical cobwebs which give a specious appearance to the pit in which you would have us fall. Keshav — Then by pointing out the trap, you can easily sweep away my sophistical cobwebs, my good Broome.

The Harmony of Virtue Treneth — What penalty for a pun? Keshav — No penalty, for to punish a lie on the information of Beelzebub is to do God’s work at the devil’s bidding. Wilson — Yes, a penalty: you shall be taken at your word. You are setting a trap for us, when you try to shuffle in your phrase about the qualities native to our humanity. If we leave this inexplicit and unlimited, you will be at liberty to describe any quality you choose as a virtue and any other quality you choose as a defect by assuming in your own insinuating manner that it is or is not native to our humanity. And in reality there is a very dis- tinct gulf between those of our qualities which are native to our humanity and those others which belong to the animal nature we are working out of our composition; for example between lust and love, of which one belongs to the lower animal nature and the other to the higher spiritual. You are ignoring the distinction and by ignoring it, you ignore the patent fact of evolution. Treneth — To ignore facts is the beginning of thought. Keshav — No, but to forget facts for the time being — that is the beginning of thought. Wilson — My dear Keshav, pray don’t trail a red paradox across the path. Keshav — It was the other boy who did it. To return to the subject, are you really unconscious of the flagrant errors of which you have been so lavish in a little space? Wilson — I am quite unconscious of any error. Keshav — You have made three to my knowledge, and the first is your assumption that what is animal, cannot be human. Wilson — Can you disprove it? Keshav — Can you prove it? In the first place you cannot tell what is animal and what is not. Wilson — Why, the qualities possessed by human beings as distinct from animals are those which are not animal. Keshav — And, I suppose, qualities possessed in common by human beings and animals, are animal? Wilson — You are right. Keshav — And such qualities ought to be worked out of our composition?

The Harmony of Virtue Wilson — Yes, as Tennyson says, we ought to be working out The tiger and the ape. Keshav — Then we ought to get rid of fidelity, ought we not? Wilson — Why so? Keshav — Because it is a quality possessed in common by the dog and the human being, and the dog is an animal. Treneth — Of course we should. Fidelity is a disease like conscience. Keshav — And infidelity is a quality possessed in common by the cat and the human being, and therefore we ought to get rid of infidelity. Treneth — Again of course; for infidelity is merely a relative term, and if fidelity is not, then how can infidelity be? Keshav — And so we must get rid of all opposing qualities and acquire a dead neutrality? Your ambition then is not to be a personality, but to be a — negative? Treneth — I confess you have taken me in the flank: even my paradoxes will not carry me so far. Keshav — And you, Broome, are you willing to break down the ladder by which we are climbing? Wilson — Not for a moment. What I mean is that the qual- ities possessed in common by all the animals and the human being are animal. Keshav — Is not the human being an animal? Wilson — Yes, scientifically. Keshav — But not really? Wilson — Well, he is something more than an animal. Keshav — You mean he has other qualities besides those which belong to the animal type? Wilson — That is what I mean. Keshav — And has not the planet other qualities besides those which belong to the astral type? Wilson — Yes. Keshav — Does that warrant us in saying that a planet is not really a star?

The Harmony of Virtue Wilson — No. Keshav — And are we warranted in saying that man is not really an animal? Wilson — We are not. Keshav — And the animal world is an element in the Cos- mos, is it not? Wilson — Yes. Keshav — Is it not then the virtue of an animal to evolve the qualities and powers native to his animality? Wilson — I suppose so. Keshav — And man, being an animal, ought also to evolve the qualities and powers native to his animality? Wilson — That seems to follow, but is not this to cancel our old description of human virtue and break down our second rung? Keshav — No, for just as the qualities native to a planet include the qualities native to a star, so the qualities native to the human type include the qualities native to the animal type. Wilson — I quite agree with you now. What was my second error? Keshav — You talked of the lower animal nature and the higher spiritual nature and in so talking assumed that the quali- ties peculiar to the human being are higher than the qualities he shares with some or all of the animals. Is dissimulation higher than love? You reject the idea with contempt: yet dissimulation is peculiar to the human being but love, and love of the most spiritual kind, he shares with the turtle-dove and with the wild- duck of the Indian marshes, who cannot sleep the live-long night because Nature has severed him from his mate but ever wails across the cold and lapping water with passionate entreaty that she may solace his anguish with even a word, and travellers straying in the forest hear his forlorn cry “Love, speak to me!” No, we can only say of varying qualities that one is beautiful and another less beautiful, or not beautiful at all; and beauty does not reside in being animal or being more than animal but in something very different. Wilson — And my third error?

The Harmony of Virtue Keshav — Your third error was to confound evolution with elimination. Wilson — And does it not really come to that? Keshav — The vulgar opinion, which finds a voice as usual in Tennyson — what opinion of the British average does he not echo? — the vulgar opinion learns that the principle of evolution or gradual perfection is the reigning principle of life and adapts the idea to its own stupid fallacy that perfection implies the elimination of all that is vivid and picturesque and likely to foster a personality. Evolution does not eliminate but perfects. Wilson — But surely perfection tends to eliminate what is imperfect? Keshav — Oh I don’t deny that we have lost our tails, but so has a Manx cat. Treneth — Dear me! that is a fruitful idea. A dissertation proving that the Manx cat is the crowning effort of Evolution might get me a Fellowship. Keshav — It would deserve it for its originality. Moreover if we have lost our tails, we have also lost our wings. Treneth — I maintain that the tails are the more serious loss. Wings would have been useful and we do not want them but we do want tails, for they would have been lovely appendages and a magnificent final flourish to the beauty of the human figure. Just fancy the Dean and Provost pacing up to the Communion Table with a fine long tail swishing about their ears! What a glorious lesson! What a sublime and instructive spectacle! Wilson — You are incorrigibly frivolous, Treneth. Keshav — If Prince Paradox is frivolous, he is virtuous, in- sofar as he is developing the virtue most intimately native to his personality; and the inquiry is dull enough at present to bear occasional touches of enlivening laughter. Wilson — Yet the inquiry must pass through stifling under- ground galleries and to avoid them is puerile. Keshav — I am at one with you, but if we must dive under the ground, there is no need to linger there. Evolution does not eliminate, but perfects. The cruelty that blossoms out in the tiger, has its seeds deep down in the nature

The Harmony of Virtue of man and if it is minimised in one generation will expand in another, nor is it possible for man to eradicate cruelty without pulling up in the same moment the bleeding roots of his own being. Yet the brute ferocity that in the tiger is graceful and just and artistic, is in the man savage and crude and inharmonious and must be cultured and refined, until it becomes a virtue and fits as gracefully and harmlessly into the perfect character, as its twin-brother physical courage and physical love, its remote relative. Wilson — You are growing almost as paradoxical as Prince Paradox, Keshav. Keshav — Look for Truth and you will find her at the bot- tom of a paradox. Are you convinced that animal qualities are not the worse for being animal? Wilson — Perfectly convinced. Keshav — And here I cannot do better than quote a sen- tence that like so many of Meredith’s sentences, goes like a knife to the root of the matter. “As she grows in the flesh when discreetly tended, nature is unimpeachable, flowerlike, yet not too decoratively a flower; you must have her with the stem, the thorns, the roots, and the fat bedding of roses.” And since I have quoted that immortal chapter so overloaded with truth critical, truth psychologic and truth philosophic, let me use two other sentences to point the moral of this argument and bid you embrace “Reality’s infinite sweetness” and “touch the skirts of Philosophy by sharing her hatred of the sham decent, her derision of sentimentalism.” May we not now ascend to the fourth rung? Wilson — Yes, I think we may go on. Keshav — I am especially eager to do so because I am more and more convinced that our description of virtue is no longer adequate: for if the only requisite is to evolve our innate qualities, will it not be enough to be merely cruel and not to be cruel in a refined and beautiful manner? Wilson — Plainly it will. Keshav — And is it really enough to be merely cruel? Treneth — No, for to be inartistic is the only sin.

The Harmony of Virtue Keshav — Your paradox cuts to the heart of the truth. Can you tell me, Broome, whether is the rose more beautiful than the bramble or the bramble than the rose? Wilson — Obviously the rose than the bramble. Keshav — And why is this? Is it not because the thorn devel- ops unduly the thorn and does not harmonize it with leaves but is careless of proportion and the eternal principle of harmony, and is beautiful indeed as an element in the harmony of plants but has no pretensions to personal beauty but the rose subdues the thorn into harmony with the leaf and the blossom and is perfectly beautiful in herself no less than as an element in the harmony of flowers? Wilson — I believe you are right. Keshav — And must not cruelty, the thorn of our beautiful human rose, be subdued into harmony with his other qualities and among them tenderness and clemency and generous forbear- ance and other qualities seemingly the most opposed to cruelty and then only will it be a real virtue but until then nothing more than a potential virtue? Wilson — You are right; then only will it be a real virtue. Keshav — So we must modify our description of virtue by affixing an epithet to the word “evolution”, and preferably I think the epithet “perfect” which does not imply size or degree or intensity or anything but justness of harmony, for example in a poem, which is not called perfect when it is merely long- drawn-out or overflowing with passion or gorgeous even to swooning, but when it blends all the elements of beauty into an irreproachable harmony. We shall then describe virtue as the perfect evolution by the human being of the inborn qualities and powers native to his personality. Wilson — With that I have no quarrel, but am I too in- quisitive when I ask you how cruelty and tenderness can live together? Keshav — My dear Broome, I shall never think you too inquisitive but above all things desire that you should have a clear intelligence of my meaning. Have you never learned by experience or otherwise how a girl will torment her favoured

The Harmony of Virtue lover by a delicate and impalpable evasion of his desires and will not give him even the loan of a kiss without wooing, but must be infinitely entreated and stretch him on the rack of a half-serious refusal and torture him with the pangs of hope just as a cat will torture a mouse, yet all the while means to give him everything he asks for and would indeed be more bitterly disappointed than he, if any accident precluded her from making him happy? Wilson — Yes, I know, some women are like that. Keshav — If you had said most women were like that, you would have hit the truth more nearly. And this trait in women we impute to feminine insincerity and to maiden coyness and to everything but the real motive, and that is the primitive and eternal passion of cruelty appearing in the coarse fibre of man as crude and inartistic barbarity, but in the sweet and delicate soul of woman as a refined and beautiful playfulness and the inseparable correlative of a gentle and suave disposition. Wilson — But I am inclined to credit the girl with the pur- pose of giving a keener relish to the gratified desire by enhancing the difficulty of attainment, and in that case she will be actuated not by cruelty but always by tenderness. Keshav — You think she is actuated by the principles of Political Economy? I cannot agree with you. Treneth — And I deny the truth of the principle. A precious thing easily acquired is treasured for its beauty and worth, but if acquired with pain and labour, the memory of the effort leaves a bad taste in the mouth which it is difficult to expunge. I read Vergil at school and never read a line of him now but Catullus I skimmed through in my arm-chair and love and appreciate. Keshav — Your distinction is subtle and suggestive, Tren- eth, but it never occurred to me in that light before. Treneth — It never occurred to me in that light before. Keshav — Yet I do not think it applies to our lovers, and it does not apply always, for the poem I have perfected with labour and thought is surely dearer to me than the light carol thrown off in the happy inspiration of the moment. Rapid generalities seldom cover more than a few cases. So I will take Broome on his own ground, not because I cannot adduce other instances of

The Harmony of Virtue cruelty and tenderness living in wedded felicity, but because I do not want to fatigue myself by recollecting them. And now, Broome, will you say that a tyrant who desires to give his favourite a keener relish of luxury and strains him on the rack and washes him with scalding oil and dries him with nettles and flays him with whips and then only comforts him with the luxury of downy pillows and velvet cushions and perfect repose, has not been actuated by cruelty but always by tenderness? Wilson — Oh,ofcourse,if you cite extravagant instances—! Keshav — And will you say that the girl who wishes to give her kiss a sweeter savour on the lips of her favourite and strains him on the rack of suspense and washes him with the scalding oil of despair and dries him with the nettles of hope and flays him with the whips of desire and then only comforts him with the velvet luxury of a kiss and the downy cushion of an embrace and the perfect repose of desire fulfilled, has not been actuated by cruelty but always by tenderness and not rather that all unnecessary pain is cruelty to the sufferer? Wilson — Certainly, unnecessary pain is cruelty. Keshav — Are you perfectly satisfied? Wilson — Perfectly satisfied. Keshav — We have discovered then that perfect evolution is requisite for perfect virtue, but I do not think we have distilled its full flavour into the epithet. Or are you of the opinion that we want nothing more than the harmonizing of all the inborn qualities? Wilson — I cannot think of any other requisite. Keshav — Can you, Treneth? Treneth — I was much attracted by something you said in the beginning about the elements of beauty and I suspect it is these we want now. Keshav — You have exactly hit it. We described it as not merely harmony in effect and proportion in detail but as pos- sessed of one of the three elements, colour, perfume and form, and in most types combining at least two and in many all three. But in confining our outlook to harmony and proportion we have talked as if human virtue were merely possessed of one

The Harmony of Virtue of the elements; yet is there any reason to suppose that human virtue does not possess the whole three? Wilson — No reason whatever. Keshav — Well, might we not inquire whether it does pos- sess all three, and if it does not, whether it may not legitimately or, to speak more properly, may not artistically possess all three? Wilson — By all means, let us inquire. Keshav — And if we find that it may artistically possess them, then, if our theory that beauty should be the governing principle in all things, is really correct, must we not say that they not only may but ought to possess all three? Wilson — Evidently we must. Treneth — That is as plain as a Cambridge laundress. Keshav — And it is clear that all qualities may, with dili- gence, be entirely divested of colour, form and perfume, and when they have reached the stage of wanting every single el- ement of beauty, we need take no notice of them, for they have no longer anything to do with virtue, until they begin to redevelop. Wilson — Obviously, for we are talking of perfect virtue or perfect beauty of character. Keshav — Now if we have not the qualities requisite for a given action, we shall not achieve the action, supposing we attempt it, but shall only achieve a blunder, is it not so? Wilson — Clearly. Keshav — But if we have the qualities, we are likely to achieve the action? Wilson — Necessarily. Keshav — Then is not action the outward manifestation of a quality, and I include in action any movement physical or intellectual which is visible or whose effects are visible to the human understanding? Wilson — Yes, but may not an action manifest the want of a quality? Keshav — No doubt, but we need not touch on those, since we have not to develop defects in order to be virtuous, or do you think we need?

The Harmony of Virtue Treneth — Clearly not: negatives cannot be virtues. Keshav — That is a very just sentiment and I shall have oc- casion to recall it. Now is not a battle the outward manifestation of the warlike qualities? Wilson — Evidently. Keshav — And composition the outward manifestation of the poetical qualities, I mean, of course, the qualities of a maker? Wilson — Yes. Keshav — And do we not mean that the poetical qualities express themselves in composition just as the sidereal in a star? Wilson — We do. Keshav — And is not the star the form of the sidereal qual- ities? Wilson — Yes. Keshav — Then is not composition the form of the poetical qualities? Wilson — That follows. Keshav — And battle of the warlike qualities? Wilson — That also. Keshav — Then is not action the form of a quality, that is to say the shape in which it expresses itself? Wilson — So it seems. Keshav — So we find that virtue has a form. Wilson — But may not qualities have a form apart from action? Treneth — For example, thought. Keshav — But the expression of thought is included in ac- tion for our purpose. Treneth — For our purpose only. Keshav — As you please. I merely want to use one projec- tion from the rock and not imperil my neck by clutching two in one hand. Treneth — I am satisfied. Keshav — I suppose, Broome, you mean by form a concrete shape? Wilson — I suppose so. Keshav — Then you must see that qualities unexpressed in

The Harmony of Virtue action are wholly chaotic and formless; and I mean within the scope of action, the expression of thought and the act of sitting or standing or lying down and the act of being indolent and anything that by any legitimate stretch of language may be called an act. Wilson — I too am satisfied. Keshav — Then we are agreed that a quality must possess form, that is to say, express itself in action or it will not be a virtue? Treneth — May it not prefer to express itself in perfume and colour? Keshav — I had forgotten that. Now if we inquire what colour is, we shall see that it is nothing concrete but merely an effect on the retina of the eye, and its prosperity lies in the eye that sees it, and if the retina of the eye is perfect, every different shade impresses itself, but if imperfect, then the eye is blind to one or more colours. Will you agree with me when I say that anything to which we give the name of colour must be the reverse of concrete? Wilson — That follows. Keshav — Then the colour of a virtue must be the reverse of concrete. Wilson — Evidently. Keshav — Now let us take metaphor into our counsel, for metaphor has sometimes an intuitive way of chiming conso- nantly with the truth; and metaphor tells us that we often talk of a scarlet and sinful character and of a white and innocent character and of a neutral and drab-coloured character, and assign various colours to various women and call one woman a splendid carnation, for we are fond of comparing women to flowers and another a beautiful and gorgeous rose, and a third a pure and sinless lily and yet another a modest violet betraying herself only by her fragrance, and are all the while implying that to the imaginative eye, if the retina is perfect, various characters have various colours. Do you follow me? Treneth — Yes, the idea is fine. Wilson — And true.

The Harmony of Virtue Treneth — That is immaterial. Keshav — And character is the composition of qualities just as a poem is the composition of sounds and a painting the composition of pigments. Wilson — Yes, just in that sense. Keshav — Then is it not plain that if a character has colour, the qualities of which it is composed must have colour. Wilson — I think it is. Keshav — And colour is not concrete, but an effect on the retina of the eye? Wilson — So we said. Keshav — Then is not the colour of a quality its effect on the retina of the imaginative eye? Wilson — Yes. Keshav — And a quality in itself may be formless? Wilson — Yes. Keshav — Then to the imaginative eye is not a quality pure colour? Wilson — I suppose so. Keshav — But the imaginative eye is not one with the per- ceptive eye, for it perceives what does not exist, but the percep- tive eye only what does exist. Wilson — You are right. Keshav — I mean that nothing without form can have an effect on the retina of the perceptive eye. Wilson — That is evident. Keshav — Then to be visible to the perceptive eye, the colour of a quality, which is really the soul of the quality, must suffuse the action which expresses it, which is the body of the quality. Wilson — It must. Keshav — And is colour without form a perfect type of beauty? Wilson — No. Keshav — Then a quality must suffuse its body with its soul, or, since the word action is growing ambiguous, its expression with its colour.

The Harmony of Virtue Wilson — Yes, I agree to that. Keshav — And so the quality will so suffuse its expression as to be visible to the perceptive eye, just as the soul of a rose, which is the effect on the retina of the imaginative eye, suffuses her form with colour which is the effect on the retina of the perceptive eye, and varies according to the variety of colours, and if two roses have the same form but one is crimson and the other yellow, the soul of the red rose is seen to be scarlet with unholy passion, but the soul of the yellow rose is seen to be dull and blanched and languid, like the reaction after intensely voluptuous enjoyment. And so virtue may possess both form and colour, and, I suppose, may artistically possess both, or will colour be detri- mental to the perfection of virtue as tinting to the perfection of sculpture? Treneth — By no means; for qualities are not hewn out of marble or cast in beaten gold or chiselled in Indian ivory, but are moulded in the delicate and flower-like texture of human emotion and, if colourless, are scarcely beautiful. Keshav — Then we are agreed that a quality must possess both form and colour, or will not be a perfect virtue? Treneth — Plainly. Wilson — I am afraid I hardly understand what we are saying. Keshav — I am certain I do not; but we must follow where the argument leads us, and I have a glimmering intelligence which I hope to see expanding into perfect daylight; but I do not want any side issue to distract my thoughts and will go on to inquire what is the perfume of a quality: for I am like a frail canoe that wavers through a tranquil to be buffeted outside by the swelling waters and have with difficulty plunged through these two waves of form and colour, when I see rolling down on me with its curled forehead this third wave of perfume which I do not hope to outlive. But to the venturous Fortune is as compliant as a captive Briseis and I will boldly plunge into the crash of the breaking water and call manner the perfume of a quality, for in manner resides the subtle aroma and sense of

The Harmony of Virtue something delicious but impalpable which is what we mean by perfume. Treneth — With your usual good luck you have notched your mark in the centre. Keshav — So by audacity I have outlived the third wave and am more than ever convinced that you must take liberties with Fortune before she will love you. I suppose you will agree with me that for a virtue to be beautiful, there must be a perfect harmony in the elements of beauty, and the colour not too subdued as in the clover nor too glaring as in the sunflower, and the perfume not too slight to be noticeable as in the pansy nor too intense for endurance as in the meadow-sweet, and the form not too monotonous as in a canal or too irregular as in the leafless tree, but all perfectly harmonious in themselves and in fit proportion to each other? Wilson — From our description of beauty, that is evident. Treneth — I plead not guilty on behalf of the sunflower, but agree with the sentiment. Keshav — And now since Broome and I are at a loss to con- jecture what we mean, do you not think we shall be enlightened by a concrete example? Treneth — It is likely. Wilson — Let us at least make an attempt. Keshav — We will call on the stage the girl and her lover, who have been so useful to us. It is clear at once that if she is not virtuous but harmonizes the elements of beauty unskilfully, the passion of her favourite will wither and not expand. Wilson — That is clear. Keshav — What then will be her manner of harmonizing them? Wilson — I return the question to you. Keshav — Well now, will she not harmonize the phases of her dalliance, and hesitate on the brink of yielding just at the proper pitch of his despair, and elude his kiss just at the proper pitch of his expectancy, and fan his longing when it sinks, and check it when it rises, and surrender herself when he is smouldering with hopeless passion?

The Harmony of Virtue Wilson — That is probably what she will do. Keshav — And is not that to cast her dalliance in a beautiful form? Wilson — It is. Keshav — But she will not do this grossly and palpably, but will lead up to everything by looks and tones and gestures so as to glide from one to the other without his perceiving and will sweeten the hard and obvious form by the flavour of the simple and natural, yet will be all the while the veriest coquette and artist in flirtation. Wilson — Yes, that is what a girl like that would do. Keshav — And is not that to give a subtle perfume to her dalliance? Wilson — I suppose it is. Keshav — But if she is perfect in the art, will she not, even when repulsing him most cruelly, allow a secret tenderness to run through her words and manner, and when she is most tenderly yielding, will she not show the sharp edge of asperity through the flowers, and in a word allow the blended cruelty and sweetness of her soul to be just palpable to his perceptive senses? Wilson — She will. Keshav — And is not that to suffuse her dalliance with colour? Wilson — Plainly. Keshav — And moreover she will not allow her affectation of the natural to be too imperfect to conceal her art or so heavily scented as to betray the intention, or the colour to be unno- ticeable from slightness or from intensity to spoil the delicate effect of her perverseness, or the form to engross too largely the attention, or indeed any element to fall too short or carry too far, but will subdue the whole trio into a just and appropriate harmony. Wilson — If she wants to be a perfect flirt, that is what she will do. Keshav — And if coquetry is native in her, to be a perfect flirt will be highest pinnacle of virtue. Wilson — That follows from the premisses.

The Harmony of Virtue Keshav — And so here we have a concrete example of per- fect virtue, and begin to understand what we mean by the perfect evolution of an inborn quality, or are you still unenlightened? Wilson — No, I perfectly understand. Keshav — Hither then we have climbed with much more laborious effort and have almost cut our hands in two on the projections, but do at last really stand on the fourth and last rung of the ladder. Wilson — The last? I rather fancy we are only half way up and shall have to ascend another three or four rungs before we are kissed by the fresh winds that carol on the brow. I have many things to ask you and you have as yet spoken nothing of the relations between man and man and how this new morality is to be modified by the needs of society and what justice means and what self-sacrifice and indeed a thousand things which will need many hours to investigate. Keshav — I am Frankenstein saddled with a monster of my own making and have made a man to my ruin and a young man to my hurt. Nevertheless “lead on, monster: we’ll follow.” Treneth — Will you not rest on the fourth rung and have a cup of tea in my rooms before you resume? Keshav — But shall we not put a stop to your spheroids and trianguloids and asinoids and all the other figures of mathemat- ical ingenuity? Treneth — I am at present watching a body which revolves on six screws and is consequently very drunk, and a day off will sensibly assist my speculations. Keshav — So let it be, but before we go I may as well recall to you at a glance what is our fourth rung. We have expanded our description of virtue as the evolution of the inborn qualities native to our personality, by throwing in the epithet “perfect”, and have interpreted the full flavour of the epithet in words to the effect that qualities in their evolved per- fection must be harmonious one with another and have a beau- tiful form or expression, and a beautiful colour or revelation of the soul, and a beautiful perfume or justly-attempered manner and must subdue all three into a just and appropriate harmony.

The Harmony of Virtue With this conviction in our souls we will journey on, de- spising the censure and alarm of the reputable, and evolve our inborn qualities and powers into a beautiful and harmonious perfection, until we walk delicately like living poems through a radiant air, and will not stunt the growth of any branch or blossom, but will prefer to the perishable laurels of this world a living crown of glory, and hear through the chaotic murmur of the ages the solemn question of Christ “What profiteth it a man if he own the whole world and lose his own soul?” and will answer according to the melodious doctrines of philosophy and acquire by a life of perfect beauty the peace of God that passeth all understanding.